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LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL, DPhil (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Yong Pung How Professor of Law, School of Law,  
Singapore Management University. 
Introduction 
21.1 The most significant case in the law of restitution in 2009 is 
probably Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 (Belinda 
Ang Saw Ean J), which involved many points in the law of restitution, 
although the central points in the case turned on agency law. In 
addition, there were a number of decisions on various aspects of the law 
of restitution, sometimes touching on the subject only incidentally. 
General principles 
21.2 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, Belinda 
Ang J helpfully set out the basis of a restitutionary claim as consisting of 
three related subordinate principles (at [260]), in addition to potential 
defences to the restitutionary claim (at [261]): 
(a) the defendant has been enriched by a benefit; 
(b) the benefit has been gained at the expense of the 
plaintiff; and 
(c) the benefit has been gained in circumstances where it 
would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain it. 
21.3 As many of the points discussed in this chapter arose from this 
case, it is appropriate to start with a summary of this decision. This case 
involved massive fraud by a senior employee, C, of the defendant 
(“APBS”), to fund C’s personal gambling activities. C had borrowed 
money from the plaintiff bank (“SEB”) (among other banks) allegedly 
on behalf of APBS. To simplify the facts somewhat, drawings on these 
loans from various institutions were put into an account at SEB held in 
the name of APBS, which was practically managed by C. At the same 
time, APBS was also defrauded by C: money mulcted from APBS was 
represented in its account books as having been placed on fixed deposit 
accounts with Citibank (not a party to the litigation), and some of the 
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“borrowed” money was in turn paid back to APBS with “interest” to 
sustain the charade. 
21.4 SEB sued APBS on various counts, including the repayment of 
the loans on the basis that C had authority to borrow the money on 
behalf of APBS, damages for vicarious liability for the fraud of C, and an 
alternative claim in restitution. SEB lost on the agency and vicarious 
liability issues. The central point of the decision turned on agency law, 
which will not be discussed in this chapter. The restitutionary claim and 
counterclaim in the case, which this chapter will focus much of its 
discussion on, centred on certain transactions in respect of the account 
held at SEB over a specific period of time, in which the money allegedly 
borrowed from various institutions had been parked, and into which C 
had also paid in money from APBS. 
21.5 SEB claimed that APBS had been unjustly enriched to the extent 
of some S$29.5m out of the sum of S$45,347,671.23 paid to APBS. The 
S$29.5m allegedly represented SEB’s share of the money taken from 
various lenders (no challenge was raised as to the plaintiff ’s right to 
trace legal title through a mixed fund (see para 21.18 below)). APBS 
argued that if SEB’s restitution claim were to succeed, it would proceed 
with a counterclaim in restitution for the repayment of the S$45m paid 
into the SEB account by C. The High Court held that SEB’s 
restitutionary claim failed in the main because APBS had not been 
enriched by the receipt of SEB’s money since the money was effectively 
paid by C in discharge of his own debt to APBS (C’s restitutionary 
obligation to repay the misappropriated money). The restitutionary 
claim succeeded, however, to the extent of the sum in excess of the 
S$45m owed to APBS (ie, S$347,671.23) which had been gratuitously 
paid by C to create the impression that APBS was earning interest from 
its “deposits”, on the basis of total failure of consideration. In respect of 
this sum, APBS could not establish the change of position defence as it 
could not point to any expenditure that it would not have made but for 
the payment of money received. 
21.6 By way of observation, the court also went on to consider the 
restitutionary counterclaim of APBS against SEB for S$45m. The 
position of APBS was that it would advance the counterclaim if SEB 
succeeded in its restitutionary claim. The counterclaim was pleaded on 
various bases of common law money had and received, dishonest receipt 
and knowing assistance (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), 
Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 788 at [331]). The court considered that APBS had a claim for 
money had and received, without commenting on the unjust factor for 
the claim or on the other causes of action (at [336]). The court was of 
the view that the claim would have succeeded, and only commented on 
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two aspects of the claim: the defence of ministerial receipt and the 
change of position defence, both of which were pleaded and failed. 
Enrichment 
21.7 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, SEB 
argued that APBS had been enriched on the principle that where an 
agent misapplies the money of a third party in discharging debts of the 
principal, the principal would be liable in equity to restore such money 
to the third party (at [265]). Thus, it was argued that as money from 
SEB paid to APBS had been used by APBS to discharge its debts and 
dividends, APBS had thereby been enriched (at [266]). This argument 
was rejected by the court on the ground that C had no authority from 
APBS to discharge these debts, and APBS had not ratified the acts of C 
in the payment of these debts (at [269]). Thus, APBS was not enriched. 
21.8 One implication of this line of reasoning would have been that 
the “paid” creditors of APBS could still demand payment from APBS, 
but they could potentially be subject to restitutionary claims by SEB as 
indirect recipients. However, the court went further to point out that in 
any event, C had not intended that the money should be used to 
discharge the debts of APBS; the transfer of money to APBS’s own 
account was intended to discharge C’s own liability to APBS for the 
misappropriation of money from APBS. APBS had a legal right to 
recover the money and C had arranged for APBS to be paid in order to 
discharge that liability (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), 
Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 788 at [269]–[272]). The court pointed out that there was no 
banker-customer relationship between SEB and APBS; that C was the 
de facto account holder of the SEB account created in the name of APBS 
and he had effective control over the account (at [270]); and that the 
payments were made by SEB at the request and direction of C 
(at [276]). 
21.9 The court further decided that as the money was paid to APBS 
at the request of C in order to discharge a debt owed by C to APBS, and 
the effect of the payment was to discharge that debt, APBS could not 
have been enriched, following Aiken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210, 
156 ER 1180 and Porter v Latec Finance (Qld) Pty Ltd (1964) 111 CLR 177 
(Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific 
Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [282]). On the other 
hand, the additional sum paid to APBS to create a semblance of 
“interest” was not legally due to APBS, and APBS was enriched to the 
extent of the receipt of that sum (at [283]). 
436 SAL Annual Review (2009) 10 SAL Ann Rev 
 
21.10 Four comments may be made. First, to the extent that the court 
denied the existence of a benefit received by APBS because it had not 
ratified any payment made by C in discharge of its debts and dividends 
(which did not happen in any event), it should be noted that although 
ratification by the principal of the agent’s actions in paying the 
principal’s creditors is one means of establishing enrichment of the 
principal, it is not the only one. It may be possible for the debtor, quite 
apart from any principles of agency, to adopt the payment (Belshaw v 
Bush (1851) 11 CB 191, 138 ER 444; see also P Birks & J Beatson, 
“Unrequested Payment of Another’s Debt” reprinted in J Beatson, Use 
and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (OUP, 1991) ch 7 at pp 178–179). On 
the findings of the court (see para 21.8 above), however, this 
consideration would not have arisen in any event. 
21.11 Secondly, although the court dealt with the discharge of a debt 
as an issue of enrichment (see Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), 
Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 788 especially at [272] and [282]), thereby going to an element 
of the cause of action, it was also treated at the same time as an issue of 
defence (at [288]–[289]). Presumably, however, if enrichment cannot be 
established, defences are irrelevant. In theory, it is not illogical to treat 
the matter as going to defence even if the payment is said to discharge 
immediately a debt owing to the recipient, for the receipt must have 
logically preceded the discharge, if only infinitesimally. Generally, the 
discharge of a debt from the receipt of an enrichment is treated as 
raising an issue of defence in the common law, specifically, the bona fide 
purchaser defence (see, for example, Lord Goff ’s approach in Lipkin 
Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548; Lloyds Bank plc v Independent 
Insurance Co Ltd [2000] QB 110 (CA)), although more uncommonly it 
has also been treated as an issue of enrichment going to the cause of 
action (see, for example, Lord Templeman’s approach in Lipkin Gorman 
v Karpnale Ltd). By treating the issue as going to the existence of 
enrichment, the court did not appear to consider the relevance of the 
bona fides of the recipient; whereas this would have been a central 
inquiry at the stage of defence. 
21.12 Thirdly, it was assumed that the right of APBS to claim 
repayment from C did not include any right to claim interest. It did not 
appear from the judgment that the court had been addressed on this 
point. Previously, the High Court in The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v 
Reliance National Asia Re Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 385 at [134]–[135], 
had adopted Lord Nicholl’s opinion in Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [2008] 1 AC 561 at [100] that the plaintiff had a 
common law right – quite apart from the statutory provision for the 
discretionary award of interest by the court under s 12 of the Civil Law 
Act (Cap 43, 1999 Ed) – to claim interest, even compound interest, as 
damages on claims on non-payment of debts as well as claims for 
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damages for breach of contract and tort. In Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [2008] 1 AC 561 at [114]–[119], Lord Nicholls 
had considered that, in the context of a restitutionary claim, the interest 
component represented the extent of the enrichment of the defendant. 
21.13 Fourthly, the reasoning of the court assumed that the effect of 
the payor’s intention to repay a debt and the actual payment is the 
automatic discharge of the debt (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 
(Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [290]); it did not apparently matter that the 
creditor was unaware of the existence of the debt. In this case, at the 
time of the payments at least, the payor’s intention was not manifested 
to the creditor, APBS, which, if it had turned its (corporate) mind to the 
matter at all, was operating under the mistake that the money was paid 
to discharge debts owing by Citibank in respect of deposits placed with 
the bank rather than debts owing by C under the law of restitution. On 
this basis, at the time of the payments, APBS, if it did so at all, appeared 
to have appropriated the payments to non-existent debts. Presumably, C 
had no authority to appropriate the payment on behalf of APBS to 
discharge his own restitutionary debt to APBS. 
21.14 It might be argued that this was a case where neither party has 
objectively appropriated the payment to identified debts, so the default 
position is that the payor’s (restitutionary) debts are discharged in 
chronological order (Nam Joo Hong Chan Feedmills Sdn Bhd v Soon Hup 
Poultry Farm [1985] 2 MLJ 206). It is not clear, however, that the cases 
on the appropriation of payments on a running account between a 
debtor and a creditor are applicable to the current situation where the 
parties were not ad idem as to the identity of the debtor. Of course, in 
any event, the payment could have been subsequently appropriated to 
the restitutionary debt once APBS became aware of it, but that would 
clearly define the issue as one of defence rather than enrichment 
received. Another argument may be based on the principle of estoppel 
(alluded to in Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore 
Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 
at [280]) that as between the fraudster and the party deceived into 
parting with the money, the fraudster cannot deny the terms on which 
the money had been parted. Provided that the relevant elements of the 
estoppel can be established, it may, however, imply that the debt arising 
from such estoppel may include alleged interest to be paid on the 
“deposits”. 
21.15 APBS had also argued that there was no enrichment because the 
cross payments made by the parties to one another cancelled each other 
out and that each payment operated as effective set off to the other’s 
claim (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [292]). 
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This argument, based on the void swap contracts cases, was rejected by 
the court on the basis that the overall accounting approach used in the 
void swap contracts cases was not appropriate to apply between two 
victims of a fraud suing one another in common law restitutionary 
claims, where the circumstances of receipt and applicable defences may 
depend on the circumstances of each respective receipt (at [301]), even 
if an overall accounting approach may be taken in the application of the 
change of position defence to specific facts (at [302]). In any event, the 
court noted that even on an overall accounting approach, APBS received 
a net benefit of S$347,671.23, for which it was liable in restitution 
subject to defences (at [303]). 
21.16 The court also accepted APBS’s argument that the S$29.5m 
claimed by SEB, which were essentially drawings from one particular 
loan facility granted by SEB, had in fact been repaid by subsequent 
drawings made by C on the same line of credit. In other words, C had, 
by rolling over the debts in accordance with the facility agreement, 
effectively borrowed further money from SEB to repay the earlier debts, 
and therefore the recipient of the benefit was actually C and not APBS 
(Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [318]). This 
argument appears to be premised on the validity of the loan facility 
agreement purportedly made between SEB and APBS, which seems to 
run counter to the finding of the court that C had no authority to 
contract on behalf of APBS. 
21.17 On the other hand, one could argue that C had intended to 
discharge the debt by the subsequent drawings on the facility by way of 
rollover, and this intention of the payor coupled with the receipt of the 
payment by SEB automatically discharged APBS’s (ex hypothesi 
restitutionary) debt. The problem with this argument, however, is that 
the voluntary payment by a third party does not discharge a debt unless 
it is adopted by the debtor. However, it is arguable that APBS, by raising 
this argument, is adopting the discharge by its conduct. On the basis 
that there was no valid loan facility agreement, it still leaves open the 
question whether, if SEB had separate restitutionary claims against C (as 
immediate recipient) and APBS (as subsequent recipient), it was able to 
choose which debt to appropriate the payment to, and if so, which had 
been chosen. Ultimately, however, this may not be a live issue because 
since both claims raise inconsistent remedies, SEB would probably be 
required to make an election anyway, and the discharge of one of the 
debts probably amounts to an election. There may, however, be an 
additional complication that at the time of the subsequent rollovers SEB 
did not know of the facts giving rise to the restitutionary debts, and 
made no conscious appropriation of the payments to such debts (see 
also paras 21.13–21.14 above). 
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Expense of the plaintiff 
21.18 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, SEB’s 
title to sue APBS for the receipt of the traceable product of SEB’s money 
was not regarded as a live issue by the parties (at [264]). Nevertheless, 
the court considered that SEB’s claim depended on its being able to 
trace its title to the sum received by APBS (at [262]). This appears to be 
on the basis that SEB was following its money disbursed to C through 
the SEB account(s) to APBS. However, although the bank had paid the 
money to APBS as agent of C (and was thereby authorised to discharge 
C’s debt), it had a debtor-creditor relationship with C and had paid out 
its own money in discharge of its own obligation to C (at [270]–[271]), 
so this is arguably a two-party situation where tracing rules are 
irrelevant. 
21.19 Be that as it may, the court pointed out that the common law 
rules of tracing do not permit tracing in or through a mixed fund 
(Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [262]). It is 
clear from the context that the court did not rule out a personal 
common law claim against a recipient of traceable funds who 
subsequently mixes the funds. The court also pointed out that tracing in 
equity, which did not have a problem with mixed funds, was not 
possible on the evidence because of the absence of a fiduciary duty 
(at [263]). 
21.20 As tracing was not a live issue, it was not surprising that the 
court did not refer to the (difficult) observations in some cases that 
tracing is a neutral process for the identification of the plaintiff ’s 
property, applicable in both common law and equity (Foskett v 
McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; see also Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong 
Tien See Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 94 at [53]). It also did not 
consider the possibility of tracing in equity in spite of the absence of a 
pre-existing fiduciary relationship by relying on a subsisting equitable 
proprietary interest arising from the fraud of the borrower (whether on 
the basis that the contract was voidable and rescinded (Lonrho plc v 
Fayed (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1 at 11–12) or possibly on a constructive 
trust imposed on a fraudster if the contract was null and void 
(Westdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council [1996] AC 669 at 715–716). 
21.21 What remains puzzling is how, given the court’s acceptance of 
the argument that the $29.5 claimed by SEB had indeed been repaid by 
C taking a further “loan” from SEB (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 
(Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [304]–[318], and see paras 21.16–21.17 above), 
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APBS had been enriched at SEB’s expense by the sum of $347,671.23. 
The origin of this sum appears to be unknown, but assumed to have 
come from the “loans” from various financial institutions (at [257]) and 
mixed into the SEB account, but as noted above, no objection had been 
taken by the defence to the mixing. All that SEB was claiming in 
restitution was its share of the money paid to APBS from the SEB 
account (ie, the $29.5m), and if that sum was no longer outstanding 
because of the subsequent rollovers, it is difficult to see how the net sum 
of $347,671.23 – which is necessarily part of the $29.5m claimed by 




21.22 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, in 
respect of SEB’s restitutionary claim against APBS, the court rejected 
SEB’s argument on the unjust factor based on payment made on a 
mistake of law that there was a valid bargain between SEB and APBS. 
The court held that there was no operative mistake in the circumstances 
because SEB had acted recklessly in choosing to rely on the certified 
extracts of APBS’s board resolution purporting to grant authority to C 
without verifying the signatures, and it had thereby voluntarily 
undertaken the risk of C acting fraudulently. In the view of the court, 
a mistaken payer has acted so recklessly as to have voluntarily assumed 
the risk of the mistake if it had failed to make a full inquiry to allay its 
suspicion, or where it nevertheless accepted the benefit though there 
were no clear conclusions (at [287]). It appeared to be sufficient that the 
circumstances would appear suspicious to a reasonable person. 
21.23 The holding of the court on this point emphasises an important 
qualification to the restitutionary ground of mistake, as it is established 
law that the carelessness of the mistaken payer does not disqualify the 
payor from claiming in restitution (Borneo Motors (S) Pte Ltd v William 
Jacks & Co Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 419 (CA) at [22]–[23]; Kelly v Solari 
(1841) 9 M & W 54). On this point, see also Mok Kwong Yue v Ding Leng 
Kong [2008] SGHC 65 at [46], noted in (2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev 434 
at 450–451, para 20.45, and also Infocommunications Development 
Authority of Singapore v Singapore Telecommunications Ltd (No 2)  
[2002] 2 SLR(R) 136, noted in (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 345 at 365, 
paras 19.61–19.63. It also affirms that the test is based on whether the 
payor can be regarded as having voluntarily assumed the risk of the 
mistake (following Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [2007] 1 AC 558 at [26]). Outside of an express 
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allocation of risk, this test has been criticised as having “little to offer 
apart from broad generalities” (H W Tang, “Settlement Agreements as 
Defences to Unjust Enrichment Claims” [2008] RLR 63 at 71). However, 
outside of a contractual context at least, it is practically very difficult to 
articulate a more precise test. 
21.24 APBS was treated as an indirect recipient (see Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [262]–[264], also see 
para 21.18 above). It is clear that a mistaken payment does not 
automatically allow the payor to trace the payment to indirect 
recipients; the plaintiff needs a proprietary base, either by establishing it 
retained legal or equitable title at the time of payment, or that the direct 
recipient was a constructive trustee or fiduciary of the payor. However, 
as the court mentioned in the context of tracing, title to sue was not 
treated as a live issue by the parties, and the court did not go into this 
issue. 
Total failure of consideration 
21.25 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, in 
respect of SEB’s restitutionary claim against APBS, the court held that 
in so far as the enrichment of APBS could be established (S$347,671.23), 
SEB succeeded on the restitutionary claim on the basis of total failure of 
consideration (at [291]). 
21.26 This approach is not without difficulties. First, it is not clear 
what the condition was that failed totally thereby justifying restitution. 
Secondly, there was no indication that the condition of payment was 
communicated to, and accepted by, the recipient (see also para 21.34 
below). It is hard to see why the recipient has to bear the risk of an 
unknown condition failing. Further, given that SEB was found to have 
assumed the risk of C’s fraud (and was thereby disentitled from relying 
on its own mistake in relation to C’s lack of authority), any condition 
turning on the consequences of C’s fraud would presumably be within 
the scope of the risk so undertaken. 
21.27 Thirdly, it could lead to the introduction of the restitutionary 
ground of misprediction by the back door (see also para 21.34 below). 
Fourthly, it is difficult to see how a restitutionary claim for total failure 
of consideration gives rise to a right to trace (although title to sue was 
not disputed (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore 
Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 
at [262]–[264], and arguably tracing was irrelevant anyway – see 
para 21.18 above). The general argument that all restitutionary claims 
like those based on total failure of consideration give rise to proprietary 
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rights to trace was rejected in Westdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale v 
Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669. Fifthly, this line of 
reasoning comes perilously close to the proposition that the absence of 
consideration at the time of payment would generate both personal and 
proprietary claims in restitution, advanced by the late Professor Birks 
(Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (OUP, 2nd Ed, 2005) chs 5 and 6) but 
which has met with academic criticism as an interpretation of the 
common law (eg, G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (OUP, 
2nd Ed, 2006) at pp 127–130; A Burrows, “Absence of Basis: The New 
Birksian Scheme” in Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks 
(A Burrows & Lord Rodger of Earlsferry eds) (OUP, 2006)). This line of 
argument based on absence of consideration has yet to receive the 
endorsement of the courts, but it would supersede and sideline claims 
based on knowing receipt generally (a result which will not be consistent 
with George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong [2010] SGCA 4). 
21.28 Indeed, the unjust factor justifying the common law claim 
against the indirect recipient of misappropriated funds is unclear, 
although the courts have never been in doubt that restitution was 
justified subject to defences (see, eg, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 
(Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [332]). In the seminal House of Lords decision 
in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 which modernised 
the English law of restitution, Lord Goff never explained clearly the 
reason for the common law restitutionary claim by the victim of 
misappropriation against an indirect recipient. Writers have 
subsequently tried to explain the ground of recovery as being based on 
the ground of ignorance (being a reason that is a fortiori from mistake) 
or on the basis of vindication of property rights. Whatever the 
explanation may turn out to be, it is suggested that total failure of 
consideration does not provide a satisfactory solution. 
Unjust enrichment and third parties 
Mistaken payments 
21.29 In Altus Technologies Pte Ltd v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp 
Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 296 (Andrew Ang J), the plaintiff had sought a 
declaration that the defendant bank was not entitled to exercise 
contractual set-off against a sum of money owed by a third party 
(a major customer of the plaintiff) to the plaintiff which the third party 
had paid under a mistake of fact to the plaintiff ’s account kept with the 
defendant, towards the payment of debts owed by the plaintiff to the 
defendant, and that consequentially the defendant should account to the 
third party the sum paid to the defendant under the mistake. The 
plaintiff alleged that the third party had been instructed to pay to the 
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plaintiff ’s account at another bank, but had mistakenly paid it to its 
account with the defendant bank. 
21.30 The court held that the plaintiff had no standing to ask for the 
declaration in the first place, as it related to the rights of other parties. 
An argument that the third party had assigned its restitutionary claim to 
the plaintiff was rejected on the basis of insufficient evidence. For 
unknown (perhaps commercial) reasons, the plaintiff declined to join 
the third party to the proceedings even after the court suggested that 
course of action. 
21.31 Additionally, the court held that there was insufficient evidence 
of a mistake in the first place. The third party was not party to the 
proceedings, so there was no direct evidence of a mistake. The fact that 
the third party had tried to cancel the payment was ambiguous, as it 
could have been the result of finding out that the defendant bank had a 
right of set-off against the plaintiff. A further argument by the plaintiff 
that the set-off violated provisions of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 
1996 Rev Ed), which will not be discussed here, was rejected by the 
court. 
21.32 The plaintiff ’s restitutionary argument having failed at the 
threshold on the lack of standing and evidence, the court did not have 
to consider whether the right of set-off could be exercised if the third 
party had indeed paid under a mistake of fact. However, it may be noted 
that even if there had been a valid assignment, the third party’s personal 
restitutionary claim against the defendant would appear to be res inter 
alios acta. Even if the plaintiff has a direct personal restitutionary claim 
by “leap-frogging” (though it is not clear that this can be established on 
the facts), that would be by way of counter-claim. It may be different if 
the third party can establish a proprietary claim against the defendant, 
which may be arguable on the principle of Chase Manhattan NA v 
Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105 as explained in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council [1996] AC 669 at 715 and applied in Re Pinkroccade Educational 
Services Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 789, that the defendant received notice 
of the mistake while holding on to identifiable funds. However, there 
would in any event have been an issue of bona fide purchase if the 
defendant could establish that the receipt of the money had been 
applied to discharge a debt owed to it by the plaintiff, before notice of 
the mistake. 
Total failure of consideration 
21.33 In Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings [2009] 
SGHC 290 (Belinda Ang Saw Ean J), one of the claims made by the 
plaintiffs against the defendant was for the sum of some S$77,500, 
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apparently mistakenly paid to the defendant for an order placed with a 
third party, a company linked to the defendant, for certain supplies. The 
court held that the restitutionary claim succeeded on the basis of total 
failure of consideration, since the supplies ordered were never supplied 
(at [74]). 
21.34 It is not clear why the claim was not argued on the simpler basis 
of mistake of fact. Grounding the claim in total failure of consideration 
raises difficulties. In the typical situation, the failure of consideration 
consists of the defendant’s failure to perform his contractual obligations. 
In this typical situation, the defendant has clearly undertaken the risk of 
non-performance. The present case did not raise the typical situation as 
this particular payment had nothing to do with the contractual 
performance between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The situation is 
basically one where A pays B money on the condition of the 
performance of an act by C. In this type of situation, it is difficult to 
justify a claim based on failure of condition if risk of the condition 
failing has not been expressly or impliedly accepted by B (see G Virgo, 
The Principles of the Law of Restitution (OUP, 2nd Ed, 2006) at p 307). 
Otherwise, there is a significant risk of upsetting transactions; many 
gifts could be recovered on the basis of undisclosed future 
contingencies. It would effectively be a claim based on misprediction, 
which has been rejected in the common law: Dextra Bank & Trust Co 
Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All ER 193 (Comm); Info-
communications Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) [2002] 2 SLR(R) 136 at [107]–[113]. 
21.35 In any event, in Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings 
[2009] SGHC 290, the plaintiffs’ claim for this sum was not contested by 
the defendant. The defendant had only claimed a right to set-off against 
its own counterclaim, which was rejected by the court on the basis that 
the counterclaim had failed. Thus, what the court said about the juristic 
basis of the claim was only by way of observation. 
Deposits and penalties 
21.36 Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings (S) Pte Ltd [2009] 
SGHC 290 (Belinda Ang Saw Ean J) provides a textbook illustration of 
the legal distinction between the law’s attitude to liquidated damages 
clauses and deposits. The plaintiffs entered into two agreements with the 
defendant in order to purchase the right to operate the defendant’s 
franchise outlets in Malaysia. 
21.37 The plaintiffs entered into a country master partner agreement 
(“CMPA”) with the defendant, under which the plaintiffs were 
permitted to operate the defendant’s franchise outlets in Malaysia for 
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eight years. The plaintiffs paid the defendant US$205,000 upfront in 
accordance with the CMPA. This was comprised of a one-time 
partnership fee of US$100,000, and 60% of the outlet fee (US$7,000) for 
a base of 25 outlets over eight years (thus 100,000 + 25 x 0.6 x 7000 = 
205,000). These fees were stipulated to be “for the use of the Shihlin 
Taiwan Street Snacks (R) Quick Service System and the Proprietary 
Marks for a period of 8 years” (Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B 
Holdings (S) Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 290 at [10]). They were also 
stipulated to be non-refundable. 
21.38 At the same time, the parties also entered into a confidentiality 
and non-competition agreement (“CNCA”), under which the plaintiffs 
undertook certain obligations of confidentiality and agreed to certain 
restrictive covenants. This contract provided that a breach of the 
restrictive covenants in the CNCA will entitle the defendant to 
terminate the CMPA and to claim from the plaintiffs five times the 
upfront fees as liquidated damages. 
21.39 The defendant claimed to have terminated the CMPA some four 
weeks later, and as a result the plaintiffs claimed contractual remedies 
for breach of contract as well as the return of the upfront fee. The 
defendant claimed to be entitled to terminate the contract and sought 
liquidated damages of US$1.025m (5 x 205,000). 
21.40 The court found that the plaintiffs had indeed breached a 
restrictive covenant in the CNCA, and that the defendant had rightfully 
terminated the CMPA as a result. However, as the termination of the 
CMPA was pursuant to an express right of termination, and there was 
no corresponding common law right because the relevant clause was 
not a condition and was not an innominate term the breach of which 
had deprived the defendant of substantially the whole benefit of the 
contract, the defendant was not entitled to damages for loss of future 
bargain (such loss being attributable to the exercise of a contractual 
right of termination rather than the breach of contract). Consequently, 
the defendant had no right to loss of bargain damages, and could not 
claim any liquidated damages. In any event, the liquidated damages 
clause was a penalty and was not enforceable as the defendant suffered 
no loss. However, the sum paid upfront was a deposit. The plaintiffs 
could not make out a claim under total failure of consideration, and also 
could not make out a case for invoking the equitable jurisdiction of 
relief against forfeiture. In short, the defendant was not entitled to 
enforce the liquidated damages clause because it was a penalty bearing 
no relationship with the actual loss suffered by the defendant; but the 
defendant was entitled to keep the upfront fee as a deposit, irrespective 
of whether it has actually suffered any loss. 
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21.41 The distinction between the law’s scrutiny of liquidated 
damages clauses for penal elements on one hand and the law’s 
indulgence towards deposits on the other, has been examined previously 
in (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 364 at 366–376, paras 20.8–20.41. A few 
aspects of the present decision are notable. 
21.42 The proposition (Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings 
(S) Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 290 at [42]) that if it turns out that there is no 
right to claim for loss of future bargain then the claim under the 
liquidated damages clause must fail appears curious, and must be 
understood in the context of the facts and arguments. The possibility of 
loss of bargain due to breaches prior to the termination (pursuant to an 
express term) of the contract, as well as possible recoverable reliance 
losses, may well provide a peg to hang an argument for upholding a 
liquidated damages clause. The court had interpreted the liquidated 
damages clause to reflect the parties’ intention to cover expectation 
losses only and not reliance losses (at [42]). Even so, since the test 
whether a liquidated damages clause is penal is determined at the time 
of the formation of the contract, it should not be tested with the benefit 
of hindsight taking into account that the present claim was for nominal 
damages only. It may be possible to contemplate other breaches which 
could potentially occur of a condition or of an innominate term with 
very serious consequences. The court’s position must be understood in 
the context that the only loss argued to justify the liquidated damages 
clause appeared to be based on the loss of the future performance by the 
plaintiff of the contract post-termination (at [46]). The decision stood 
on surer footing on the basis that the liquidated damages clause was 
penal in nature on the basis that the single large sum was payable 
irrespective of the type or consequences of the breach, and of whether 
the breach occurred one month after commencement or one month 
before expiry of the contract (at [47]). 
21.43 The contracting parties had clearly intended the upfront 
payment to be non-refundable. It was thus clearly intended to be 
security for the performance of the contract, ie, a deposit or earnest 
money, rather than merely part-payment. The court relied (Tan Wee 
Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings (S) Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 290 
at [51]) on the observation of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Lee 
Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR(R) 537 at [84] to the effect 
that: 
The invariable judicial approach to forfeitable deposits at common law 
is that the deposit will be forfeited to the payee upon the discharge of 
the contract on the default of the payer, irrespective of whether it 
would have been deemed part-payment had the contract been 
completed. 
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21.44 It has previously been queried whether this statement should 
not be read too literally, because the common law as developed 
elsewhere does distinguish between a reasonable deposit to which the 
above observation applies, and a colourable deposit which the common 
law would treat as a part-payment only and thus subject to 
restitutionary recovery: (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 364 at 367–369, 
paras 20.12–20.18. The present decision leaves the same query open, 
because the court considered the possibility of restitutionary recovery 
on the basis of total failure of consideration, but denied the claim on the 
ground that there had been no total failure of consideration. This line of 
reasoning is only compatible with disregarding the element of earnest in 
the deposit and treating the sum paid as mere part-payment. It should 
be noted, however, that the court made no reference to the question of 
the reasonableness of the deposit. 
21.45 The court held that the common law claim for restitution for 
total failure of consideration failed because the plaintiffs got what they 
had bargained for (Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings (S) Pte 
Ltd [2009] SGHC 290 at [56]): the right to run franchise outlets in 
Malaysia for eight years; it did not matter that the right was 
subsequently and shortly forfeited due to the lawful termination of the 
contract by the defendant. Additionally, the defendant had handed to 
the plaintiffs operational manuals and materials and some confidential 
information relating to the operation of the franchise outlets. No 
argument appeared to have been made for partial failure of consideration 
(Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 778) or severing the consideration (Whincup v 
Hughes (1871) LR 6 CP 78 at 81; Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall 
Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68, (2001) 208 CLR 516; see also Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 682). 
21.46 The concept of “consideration” in the restitutionary claim for 
total failure of consideration is not the same as the consideration 
supporting the existence of a legally enforceable contract; instead it 
means the basis of the payment. Nothing suggests that the two concepts 
have been conflated in the case. Nevertheless, there is some inherent 
flexibility in the construction of the “consideration” (see G Virgo, The 
Principles of the Law of Restitution (OUP, 2nd Ed, 2006) at pp 315–323). 
In general, the question is “whether the promisor has performed any 
part of the contractual duties in respect of which the payment is due” 
(Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL) 
at 588), where the “consideration” is construed to be the contractual 
performance of the defendant. The assumption made in the instant case 
is that the subject of the contractual bargain (for which payment was 
due) was the transfer of the right to use the defendant’s branding and 
methods; if it had been construed as the actual use of the branding and 
methods, then it may have been possible to argue at least that the 
running of the 25 outlets which have yet to open is a severable part of 
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the bargain for which there has been total failure of consideration (for 
an analogy in a different context, compare Rowland v Divall [1923] 
2 KB 500 with Yeoman Credit Ltd v Apps [1962] 2 QB 508). 
21.47 Having rejected the common law restitutionary claim, the court 
next considered the argument for a refund in equity and also rejected it. 
The court pointed out that the plaintiffs had failed sufficiently to 
differentiate the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties and to 
relieve against forfeitures, and that the relevant jurisdiction was the one 
to relieve against forfeiture. The court then noted the importance of 
certainty in commercial contracts and the general reluctance of relevant 
authorities to extend the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture to cases not dealing with the forfeiture of property interests. 
The court held that even if the jurisdiction were to apply to the 
forfeiture of money payments, the plaintiffs had failed to invoke the 
equitable jurisdiction as they had not, in their pleadings or arguments, 
pointed to any unconscionability in the defendant’s conduct (Tan Wee 
Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B Holdings (S) Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 290 at [65] 
and [71]). 
21.48 The court considered that it did not have to choose, in such a 
case, between the views (by way of observation) of Denning LJ (with 
whom Sommervell LJ agreed) or Romer LJ in Stockloser v Johnson 
[1954] 1 QB 476, because both were founded on the finding of the 
unconscionability of the defendant (Tan Wee Fong v Denieru Tatsu F&B 
Holdings (S) Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 290 at [71]). With respect, this 
somewhat oversimplifies the issue. While Romer LJ required some form 
of fraud or sharp practice (Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476 at 501), 
all that Denning LJ required was that the defendant “ought not unjustly 
enrich himself at the plaintiff ’s expense” (Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 
1 QB 476 at 492). By implication, the court appeared to have adopted, 
or at least preferred, the narrow view of unconscionability in that case. 
21.49 The distinction between liquidated damages clauses and 
deposits creates a tension in the law. No doubt the law should be slow to 
interfere in commercial transactions. However, the intervention in the 
case of penal liquidated damages clauses is well established. It is also 
clear that neither common law nor equity will interfere if the deposit  
is a reasonable one (see (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 364 at 368–369, 
paras 20.13–20.19). This case arguably raises a situation where the 
deposit is unreasonable (see paras 21.43–21.44 above), but the common 
law remedy is deficient. Whether there should be a residual role for the 
equitable jurisdiction in this context is controversial (see (2007) 8 SAL 
Ann Rev 364 at 370–372 and 375, paras 20.22–20.25, and 20.37). 
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Relief against forfeiture 
21.50 The decision of the High Court in Sembawang Capital Pte Ltd v 
Ng Hock Kon [2009] 1 SLR 833 (noted in (2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev 434 
at 443–445, paras 20.23–20.28) was overturned on appeal in Ng Hock 
Kon v Sembawang Capital Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 307 (Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong JA, Chan Sek Keong CJ and V K Rajah JA). Although the 
Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s stand on the denial of relief 
against forfeiture, the appeal succeeded on the basis that the contract 
had not been properly terminated in the first place. The Court of Appeal 
noted that the appellant’s attempt to invoke the jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture in an ordinary mortgagor-mortgagee relationship had 
no merit; the jurisdiction is not relevant when the issue is whether the 
mortgagee is contractually entitled to enforce its rights (at [35]). 
Election of remedies 
21.51 In Main-Line Corporate Holdings Ltd v United Overseas Bank 
Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 189 (Belinda Ang Saw Ean J), the plaintiff, having 
previously succeeded in a liability trial against two defendants in an 
action for patent infringement, elected for the remedy of an account of 
profits against the first defendant and the remedy of compensatory 
damages against the second defendant. The defendants objected to this 
course of action and demanded that the plaintiff make an election of the 
same remedy against both defendants. The assistant registrar agreed 
with the defendants, and the plaintiff ’s appeal came before the High 
Court which allowed the appeal. 
21.52 The court held that while a plaintiff is required to elect between 
different monetary reliefs which are available against a single defendant 
in respect of a single cause of action, there was no such requirement 
where the claimant is seeking different remedies against several 
tortfeasors causing different damage, or cumulative remedies against the 
same person for distinct claims (Main-Line Corporate Holdings Ltd v 
United Overseas Bank Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 189 at [34]). In this case, the two 
defendants were several tortfeasors (the court noted at [50] that joint 
tortfeasorship of the defendants was not pleaded) causing different 
damage to the plaintiff (at [44]). The second defendant’s appeal was 
dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 February 2010 (unreported). 
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Defences 
Change of position 
21.53 Returning to Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), 
Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 788, the decision makes two important points about the bona 
fide change of position defence: that a causal link is necessary between 
the change of position and the receipt of the benefit; and that the 
recipient is disqualified from relying on the defence if (in a commercial 
context) it had acted in a commercially unacceptable manner. 
21.54 On SEB’s restitutionary claim against APBS, the latter’s defence 
of change of position failed because it failed to demonstrate any 
extraordinary change of position which was causally linked to the 
receipt. The court acknowledged that anticipatory change of position 
was part of Singapore law (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), 
Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 788 at [322]), so expenditure in clear expectation of an 
imminent receipt could qualify. 
21.55 However, the defence was ultimately rejected on the facts 
because none of the expenditure raised by APBS could be said to have 
occurred “but for” the receipt of the payment (Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [324]). The court rejected the contention 
of counsel for APBS that there was no need to prove a causal link 
between the receipt of the money and the change of position (at [325]). 
The court opined that although it has not been expressly articulated, the 
test underlay the authorities in Singapore law (at [326]–[327] and 
[329]). The court rejected the argument based on Commerzbank AG v 
Price-Jones [2003] EWCA Civ 1663 that it was enough to establish that a 
relevant connection existed between the alleged change of position and 
the (actual or anticipated) receipt of the benefit such that the change of 
position was in some way referable to the receipt (at [328]–[329]). The 
court acknowledged that the exact causal test has not yet been 
established in the law. Given the findings by the court, it did not have to, 
and did not, address causation questions relating to concurrent causes 
or to the dissipation of the enrichment without positive action by the 
recipient (eg, theft or destruction). 
21.56 In respect of the restitutionary counterclaim of APBS against 
SEB, the change of position defence also failed for the same reason 
above, that SEB had failed to point to any causal expenditure in reliance 
of the receipt. One key reason why the causal test failed was that in 
making the payments out of the account managed by C, SEB had 
voluntarily assumed the risk of C acting fraudulently, and in continuing 
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to give credit to (what it thought was) APBS, SEB had acted out of 
eagerness to cultivate a relationship with APBS (Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [338]). 
21.57 Further, in so far as SEB’s change of position defence was based 
on payments made to third parties at the instruction of C, the court was 
of the view that SEB was disqualified from the change of position 
defence because it had not acted in good faith. The court accepted the 
approach in Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 115 (CA) and 
Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2004] 
QB 985 (CA) that whether the recipient had acted in good faith was 
largely a question of fact whether its conduct was commercially 
unacceptable (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore 
Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 
at [342] and [345]). In the view of the court, SEB’s failure to verify  
the signatures on the certified extracts of the board resolutions, its 
failure to make inquiries in respect of payments made to a Melbourne 
casino and its failure to monitor the cash cheques issued by C, all 
pointed to commercially unacceptable conduct in the circumstances 
(at [345]–[348]). It would appear that the court focused on the objective 
conduct of SEB rather than its subjective state of mind. The recipient’s 
subjective state of mind is relevant to the objective assessment of his 
conduct; it is not determinative. 
Bona fide purchase 
21.58 To the extent that Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), 
Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 788 raised the issue of bona fide defence, this has been 
discussed above (at paras 21.7–21.17 above). 
Ministerial receipt 
21.59 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, in 
respect of APBS’s restitutionary counterclaim against SEB, the argument 
of SEB that it had not been enriched because of the defence of 
ministerial receipt was rejected. The court was of the view that although 
an agent receiving money on behalf of a principal was entitled to the 
ministerial receipt defence, on the facts of the case, there was no 
evidence that the transfers were made to SEB merely as an intermediary. 
The normal relationship between a bank and customer in respect of a 
bank account in credit is that of debtor and creditor; a bank receives 
money paid into a bank account as the bank’s own funds, subject to the 
bank assuming a personal liability in debt to the account holder for an 
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equivalent sum. Thus, in the court’s view, SEB had received the money 
beneficially (at [335]–[336]). 
Limitation period 
21.60 Neo Kok Eng v Yeow Chern Lean [2008] SGHC 151, noted in 
(2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev 434 at 449 and 451, paras 20.43 and 20.46–20.48, 
was reversed in part in Yeow Chern Lean v Neo Kok Eng [2009] 
3 SLR(R) 1131 (CA: Chao Hick Tin, Andrew Phang Boon Leong and 
V K Rajah JJA), to the extent that the Court of Appeal found that the 
first plaintiff did not have the requisite possessory title in the cheques 
(the cheques having been given by the first plaintiff to the defendant as a 
loan to the plaintiff ’s company) to sue for the conversion of them. It 
followed that any restitutionary action for money had and received in 
respect of the proceeds of the cheque, which the court characterised as 
being premised on “waiver of tort”, would necessarily fail. No comment 
was made on the ruling of the court below that while the claim in the 
tort of conversion would be barred by s 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 
(Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed), the alternative restitutionary claim on the 
waiver of the tort would not be so barred as it is not caught by the 
Limitation Act at all. This distinction is a troublesome one (see (2008) 
9 SAL Ann Rev 434 at 451, para 20.47), and the Court of Appeal’s silence 
on the issue cannot be seen as an endorsement of it. 
21.61 Cytec Industries Pte Ltd v APP Chemicals International (Mau) 
Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 769 (Andrew Ang J) was not a case on the law of 
restitution, but it has some bearing on the issue of limitation periods 
applicable to common law restitutionary actions. It has been noted that 
under Singapore law, it appears that no statutory limitation period 
applies to common law restitutionary claims because such claims are 
not based on contract, tort or equity; recourse may instead be made to 
the equitable doctrine of laches even when a common law remedy is 
being sought to enforce a common law right (ie, no equitable relief is 
sought): Management Corp Strata Title No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte 
Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 418 (CA); (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 345 at 358–360, 
paras 19.42–19.47; (2004) 5 SAL Ann Rev 436 at 442–444,  
paras 19.20–19.26 (“De Beers”). This case casts doubt on the latter 
proposition, as the court held that laches could not apply to a claim on a 
debt at common law where no equitable remedies are sought (Cytec 
Industries Pte Ltd v APP Chemicals International (Mau) Ltd [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 769 at [43]–[50]). The court, however, did not refer to the 
Court of Appeal decision in De Beers. Although the present case may be 
distinguishable because there was already an applicable statutory 
limitation period, the reasoning of the court is based more generally on 
the avoidance of the fusion fallacy. 
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21.62 Further, in Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc [2009] SGCA 60 
(Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, Chan Sek Keong CJ and V K Rajah JA), 
which is also outside the field of the law of the restitution, the Court of 
Appeal proceeded on the assumption that for the purpose of the 
application of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed), a claim to 
enforce a foreign judgment at common law – which like the common 
law restitutionary claim is based on an implied (ie, fictional) promise to 
pay a debt (quasi-contract) – is caught by the provision prohibiting 
actions founded on a contract. While this case has nothing to do with 
the law of restitution as such, the unarticulated premise upon which the 
court proceeded on the limitation period issue (that “contract” under 
the Limitation Act may include quasi-contract) is difficult to reconcile 
with that underlying the position of the previous court in Management 
Corp Strata Title No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 
1 SLR(R) 418 (CA). 
Jurisdiction of the District Court 
21.63 One further consequence of Management Corp Strata Title 
No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 418 has manifested 
itself in the District Court. In The Redwood Tree Pte Ltd v CPL Trading 
Pte Ltd [2009] SGDC 204 (District Judge Leslie Chew), the court held 
that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an action for money had and 
received for the recovery of a deposit on the basis that there was no 
contract between the parties. It held that the action was not founded on 
contract, and there were no other provisions in the Subordinate Courts 
Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) that conferred jurisdiction on the District 
Court in respect of this cause of action. The court refused to accept the 
argument that being founded historically on “quasi-contract” the claim 
could be brought within the language of “contract” in the Act. The court 
in the present case conveyed its sympathy for the plaintiff who had 
wasted expenses in the action and who would incur further expenses to 
bring its claim for $23,350 in the High Court. However, it also noted 
that as an inferior court, its jurisdiction was strictly constrained by 
statute. 
21.64 Although the court did not cite Management Corp Strata Title 
No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 418 (CA) as an 
authority, it was probably in the minds of the court and counsel as the 
leading authority in Singapore that an action for money had and 
received was founded not on the principles of contract, tort or equity 
(para 21.61 above, at [32]), but on the principle against unjust 
enrichment. Oddly, the District Court characterised it as an equitable 
remedy, though this did not in the end make any difference to the result. 
It is true that Lord Mansfield described the action for money had and 
received as a “kind of equitable action” in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 
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2 Burrow 1005 at 1012, 97 ER 676 at 680; nevertheless the action was 
clearly rooted in the common law. As Gummow J explained in 
Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68, 
(2001) 208 CLR 516 at [100], Moses v Macferlan was an instance where 
“notions derived from equity have been worked into and in that sense 
have become part of the fabric of the common law”. 
